From Thaler v. Vidal:
This case presents the question of who, or what, can be
an inventor. Specifically, we are asked to decide if an arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) software system can be listed as the
inventor on a patent application. At first, it might seem
that resolving this issue would involve an abstract inquiry
into the nature of invention or the rights, if any, of AI sys-
tems. In fact, however, we do not need to ponder these met-
aphysical matters. Instead, our task begins – and ends –
with consideration of the applicable definition in the rele-
vant statute.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
undertook the same analysis and concluded that the Patent
Act defines “inventor” as limited to natural persons; that
is, human beings. Accordingly, the PTO denied Stephen
Thaler’s patent applications, which failed to list any hu-
man as an inventor. Thaler challenged that conclusion in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
which agreed with the PTO and granted it summary judg-
ment. We, too, conclude that the Patent Act requires an
“inventor” to be a natural person and, therefore, affirm.
The CAFC did not reach Chevron deference.
The sole issue on appeal is whether an AI software sys-
tem can be an “inventor” under the Patent Act. In resolv-
ing disputes of statutory interpretation, we “begin[] with
the statutory text, and end[] there as well if the text is un-
ambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176,
183 (2004). Here, there is no ambiguity: the Patent Act
requires that inventors must be natural persons; that is,
human beings.
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