From the case:
We affirm because Mr. Agarwal has not adequately developed an argument for why we should do otherwise.
“It is well established that arguments that are not appropriately developed in a party’s briefing may be deemed
waived.” United States v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
738 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320
(Fed. Cir. 2006)); see also Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc.
v. Sec’y of the Army, 973 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(noting that failure to “meaningfully brief[]” an issue on
which the appellant needed to prevail to achieve its requested relief “alone would justify affirmance”). “The recitation of the applicable law . . . does not prevent the waiver
of an argument unless that recitation is accompanied by an
explanation of how the law applies to the facts of the particular case.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects Ams.,
238 F. App’x 605, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (nonprecedential).
Mr. Agarwal’s argument for why the district court’s
claim construction was erroneous is reproduced in its entirety below:
The district court imported limitations concerning
the construction/operation of the preferred embodiment into the claim scope of “passive sensor” absent lexicography/disclaimer. This was improper
under GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. Agilight, Inc.,
750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Appellant’s Informal Br. 2.
This argument does not explain how the general principle against importing limitations from preferred embodiments applies to this case; indeed, it doesn’t identify what
limitations Mr. Agarwal believes the district court erred in
importing. Mr. Agarwal’s perfunctory presentation of his
claim-construction argument amounts to no presentation
at all.
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