The outcome:
Arthrex, Inc. appeals a Patent Trial and Appeal Board
final written decision finding claims 1, 4, 8, 10–12, 16, 18,
and 25–28 of U.S. Patent No. 9,179,907 unpatentable as
anticipated. It also challenges a decision by the Commissioner
for Patents denying Arthrex’s request for the Director of the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to review the
Board’s decision and grant rehearing. We affirm.
And remember
Arthrex appealed. It primarily challenged the Board’s
decision on the merits, but it also argued that the Board
lacked constitutional authority to issue the agency’s final
decision. Arthrex reasoned that the Board could not issue
final decisions because its Administrative Patent Judges
(APJs) were not nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, as the Appointments Clause requires for
principal officers. We agreed with Arthrex’s constitutional
challenge and held that the appropriate remedy was to (1)
sever the statutory limitations on the removal of APJs and
(2) remand for rehearing by a new panel of APJs. Arthrex,
Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1338, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2019). We did not reach the merits of the Board’s
decision.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. United
States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021) (Arthrex). It
agreed that because APJs are appointed by the Secretary
of Commerce, rather than the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, they could not issue any “final
decision binding the Executive Branch.” Id. at 1985. The
Court held, however, that the appropriate remedy was to
(1) exempt the Director from 35 U.S.C. § 6(c), which precludes anyone
but the Board from granting rehearing of a
Board decision, and (2) “remand to the Acting Director for
him to decide whether to rehear” the case. Id. at 1987.
What was happening after remand?
On remand, Arthrex requested “rehearing by the Director.” Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., IPR2017-
00275, Paper 39 at 1 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 27, 2021). The office of
the Director was, however, vacant. As was the office of
Deputy Director, which is “vested with the authority to act
in the capacity of the Director in the event of [his] absence
or incapacity.” 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(1). The responsibility of
addressing Arthrex’s request thus fell to the Commissioner
under a standing directive known as Agency Organization
Order 45-1.
The CAFC went back to 1898:
Although an inferior officer generally cannot issue a final agency decision, he may perform the functions and duties of an absent PAS officer on a temporary, acting basis.
United States v. Eaton is instructive. 169 U.S. 331 (1898).
After falling ill, the consul general to Siam, Sempronius
Boyd, a PAS officer, unilaterally appointed Lewis Eaton,
then a missionary, to the position of vice consul general.
Id. at 331–32. Mr. Boyd then took a leave of absence, returning to his home in Missouri, where he later died. Id.
at 332–33. In the period between Mr. Boyd’s departure and
his replacement’s arrival, Mr. Eaton was required by law
to “temporarily . . . fill the place[ ] of consul[ ] general,”
which he did. Id. at 336 (quoting Revised Statutes § 1674).
The government, however, refused to pay Mr. Eaton for his
services. It argued that Congress violated the Appointments Clause by authorizing the President to promulgate
the consular regulations Mr. Boyd invoked to appoint Mr.
Eaton. See id. at 343.
This case is indistinguishable from Eaton.
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