CalAmp wins; issue of "what" can be appealed

The outcome:


CalAmp Corp. (“CalAmp”) appeals from a judgment of infringement and award of damages as to U.S. Patent No. 8,032,278 (“the ’278 patent”). Omega Patents, LLC (“Omega”) cross-appeals the district court’s determination of the post-verdict royalty rate. We affirm the judgment of infringement of the asserted claims of the ’278 patent but vacate and remand for a new trial on damages. Omega’s cross-appeal is therefore moot. The jury further found that CalAmp did not induce infringement of the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,756,885 (“the ’885 patent”) and Omega does not appeal that determination. CalAmp, however, appeals the jury’s underlying finding of direct infringement of the asserted claims by CalAmp’s customers. We vacate the jury’s finding of direct infringement.


Some discussion


CalAmp appeals (1) the district court’s denial of JMOL that CalAmp’s customers did not directly infringe the ’885 patent (and in the alternative, CalAmp requests that we vacate the direct-infringement finding); (2) the district court’s denial of JMOL and a new trial on CalAmp’s infringement of the ’278 patent; and (3) the district court’s denial of remittitur and a new trial as to damages for the ’278 patent. Omega cross-appeals the district court’s determination of the ongoing royalty rate for infringement of the ’278 patent.
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CalAmp does appeal, however, an underlying finding of direct infringement by CalAmp’s customers—specifically, the district court’s denial of JMOL that those customers did not directly infringe. The direct-infringement finding did not itself impose liability on CalAmp but instead was intended to serve as a predicate to Omega’s induced-infringement theory. In the alternative, CalAmp requests that we vacate the jury’s finding if we do not consider the merits. Because CalAmp is the prevailing party as to Omega’s claim of induced infringement of the ’885 patent, we decline to review the merits of CalAmp’s appeal of the JMOL denial regarding direct infringement by its customers. See Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“An appeal is not an opportunity to bring before the appellate court every ruling with which one of the parties disagrees without regard to whether the ruling has in any way impacted the final judgment.”). Here, the final judgment of no induced infringement is not before us, and it is a “well-established rule that, as an appellate tribunal, we review judgments, not opinions” or predicate findings. Droplets, Inc. v. E*TRADE Bank, 887 F.3d 1309, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see Tesco Corp. v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 804 F.3d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (declining “to address the predicate findings in the trial court’s opinion”).

Nonetheless, we agree with CalAmp that the jury’s direct-infringement finding should be vacated

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As the Supreme Court has stated, “[a] party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance . . . ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in that ruling.” Camreta, 563 U.S. at 712 (cleaned up). Under such circumstances, “[t]he equitable remedy of vacatur ensures that those who have been prevented from obtaining the review to which they are entitled are not treated as if there had been a review.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, appellate review is unavailable to CalAmp through no action or fault of its own. Accordingly, to “expunge[] an adverse decision that would be reviewable had this [issue] not become moot,” id. at 712 n.10, we vacate the jury’s finding of direct infringement of the asserted claims of the ’885 patent by CalAmp’s customers.