SSL prevails over Citrix on the '011 patent
As to willful infringement, from
SSL v. Citrix:
To establish willful infringement, the patent holder
must show clear and convincing evidence that: (1) “the
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that
its actions constituted infringement” and (2) “that this
objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so obvious
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). We review the first objective
prong de novo and the second subjective prong for substantial
evidence. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v.
W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005–08 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 932 (2013).
After the district court found the objective prong satisfied,
it submitted the issue of willful infringement to the
jury. The jury returned a verdict finding that Citrix
willfully infringed the relevant claims of the ’011 Patent.
SSL and the district court pointed to several items to
support the jury’s finding of willfulness, including the VOne
Agreements, V-One executives’ confirmation of
Citrix’s knowledge of the ’011 Patent, Citrix’s full access
to the V-One technology, and a Citrix executive’s admission
of knowledge of the ’011 Patent based on the V-One
Citrix disagrees, claiming that substantial evidence
does not support the subjective prong of willfulness.
As to opinions about infringement by non-legal
Citrix argues that it should receive a new trial on
willfulness because the court prevented the jury from
hearing fact testimony from its Chief Engineer, Marco
Murgia, that: (1) Citrix believed in good faith that its
products were non-infringing; and (2) that reexamination
proceedings had been initiated at the PTO. The district
court held that Murgia could not opine on whether the
accused products infringed claims of the ’011 Patent to
support Citrix’s good faith belief of non-infringement.
SSL Servs., 940 F. Supp. 2d at 500–01. Specifically, the
district court found that “it would be significantly prejudicial
to allow a fact witness[ ] to testify as to his opinions
on the issues of infringement and validity, particularly
when the testimony expressing such an opinion would be
rendered without regard for how this Court has construed
the claims.” Id. at 500. The district court also precluded
testimony on the then
As to obviousness:
We review the ultimate legal conclusion of
obviousness de novo in light of the underlying factual
findings. Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1356–57.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
court’s judgment of non-infringement of the ’796 Patent,
willful infringement of the ’011 Patent, no invalidity of
the ’011 Patent, award of prejudgment interest, and find
no error in its evidentiary rulings. We also vacate the
district court’s finding of no prevailing party and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.