Stackpole's take on East Cavalry Field in 1956

Of Gettysburg's East Cavalry Field, IPBiz has discussed the unfavorable reviews given to Walker's book, and the numerous favorable reviews given to Carhart's book (e.g., at civilwarinteractive), all for basically the same, unsupported, theory.

One of the favorable reviews of Carhart's book addressed the fact that the theory had (seemingly) been published before, but concluded that creating a ruckus in the Union rear (mentioned before) was distinct from an attack to the derriere (his take on Carhart).

This approach seems to be slicing the salami very thin.

Edward J. Stackpole published "They met at Gettysburg" in 1956, roughly 50 years before Carhart's book appeared. At page 279, one has "In order to exploit the anticipated breakthrough, Stuart's cavalry was assigned the mission of circling the Confederate left to the north around Gettysburg, coming in on Meade's rear at the pyschological moment, and giving the Army of the Potomac the coup de grace." One notes that his language is consistent with what Stuart himself said, as quoted, for example, by Rawle.

Stackpole has a nice map on page 280, titled "Battle of Gettysburg Cavalry Combat Juy 3, 2:30pm." The text (page 281) accompanying the map is as follows: "Lee ordered Stuart to move out from the vicinity of Gettysbur, and, simultaneously with Longstreet's main effort, drive hard for the Union rear. This sound plan failed because Gregg successfully intercepted Stuart in the area shown here. Stuart formed his brigades on Cress' Ridge. Then after some preliminary action in which Gregg's dismounted units inflicted losses on the Confederates with their carbines, Stuart moved south across the pastures in a mounted attack. He was met headlong by Custer, whose brigade was then attached to Greeg. After a wild, confused melee, Stuart withdrew, leaving the main Union position unmolested."

As to the novelty of Carhart's theory, one notes Stackpole's words:

...simultaneously with Longstreet's main effort, drive hard for the Union rear. This sound plan failed because Gregg successfully intercepted Stuart in the area shown here.

Of Carhart's numbers, one notes that Stackpole said on page 281: "Gregg now had about 5,000 sabers and several artillery batteries to engage Stuart's somewhat superior strength, although Jenkin's mounted infantry [Confederates] through some mistake had only ten rounds of ammunition per man, a rather sketchy supply for a knockdown fight."

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As a separate point, IPBiz notes a controversy over Gettysburg writings stirred up by Gary Gallagher (see for example thread at civilwarmemory).

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Note that Carhart will be speaking at the 9th Annual Custer Week in Monroe, Michigan in September 2007.