Brooklyn Brewery case as to standing
One notes that two different issues on standing were presented in the Brooklyn Brewery case:
BBS argues that Brewery lacks both Article III and statutory standing to appeal the Board’s decision dismissing the Opposition as to the Class 5 goods (sanitizing preparations). Although we have not yet had occasion to address Article III standing in a trademark case, our cases in the patent context have made clear that the statute does not set forth the exclusive test for standing when a decision of an administrative agency is appealed in federal court. The appellant must also satisfy the requirements of Article III. See, e.g., Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]lthough Article III standing is not necessarily a requirement to appear before an administrative agency [such as the TTAB], once a party seeks review in a federal court, ‘the constitutional requirement that it have standing kicks in.’” (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002))). This is because Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to hearing “Cases” or “Controversies,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, and “Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to [an appellant] who could not otherwise have standing,” Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)). Accordingly, we must address Article III standing.
“To meet the constitutional minimum for standing, the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must satisfy three requirements.” Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1260–61 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). First, the party must show that it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, it must show that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action. Id at 560. And third, the party must show that it is “likely,” rather than “merely speculative,” that a favorable judicial decision will redress the injury. Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although certain of these requirements, “namely immediacy and redressability,” may be relaxed “where Congress has accorded a procedural right to a litigant,” Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1261 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007)), the “requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute,” id. (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009)).
See also The issue of standing, as discussed by CA9 in Washington v. Trump
In Florida, 28 October 2021
https://www.news4jax.com/news/florida/2021/10/28/case-against-mask-mandate-ban-will-be-expedited/
BBS argues that Brewery lacks both Article III and statutory standing to appeal the Board’s decision dismissing the Opposition as to the Class 5 goods (sanitizing preparations). Although we have not yet had occasion to address Article III standing in a trademark case, our cases in the patent context have made clear that the statute does not set forth the exclusive test for standing when a decision of an administrative agency is appealed in federal court. The appellant must also satisfy the requirements of Article III. See, e.g., Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]lthough Article III standing is not necessarily a requirement to appear before an administrative agency [such as the TTAB], once a party seeks review in a federal court, ‘the constitutional requirement that it have standing kicks in.’” (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002))). This is because Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to hearing “Cases” or “Controversies,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, and “Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to [an appellant] who could not otherwise have standing,” Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)). Accordingly, we must address Article III standing.
“To meet the constitutional minimum for standing, the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must satisfy three requirements.” Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1260–61 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). First, the party must show that it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, it must show that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action. Id at 560. And third, the party must show that it is “likely,” rather than “merely speculative,” that a favorable judicial decision will redress the injury. Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although certain of these requirements, “namely immediacy and redressability,” may be relaxed “where Congress has accorded a procedural right to a litigant,” Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1261 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007)), the “requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute,” id. (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009)).
See also The issue of standing, as discussed by CA9 in Washington v. Trump
In Florida, 28 October 2021
https://www.news4jax.com/news/florida/2021/10/28/case-against-mask-mandate-ban-will-be-expedited/
posted by Lawrence B. Ebert at 8:31 AM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home