Sunday, February 17, 2019

United States published patent application 20190050629, SELECTIVE IDENTITY RECOGNITION UTILIZING OBJECT TRACKING

The background section of the Amazon application states

Multimedia content such as video content is used in multiple settings
and presents many difficult challenges in the context of video processing,
such as recognizing and identifying objects moving through the multimedia content.
Multimedia content often includes large amount of information that make it challenging
to process the video to determine, for example, when a particular individual is present in the video.
Determining when a particular individual or other object is present
in the video may require performing an identity recognition process
and it may be computationally infeasible or inefficient to perform repeated identity recognition processes.

The first claim states:

A computer-implemented method, comprising: identifying a person in a first image
of the person in a video; detecting a loss of identification of the person;
detecting a second image of a person in the video; and determining whether
the person in the first image is the same as the person in the second image,
wherein the determining includes identifying a face of the person.

Thursday, February 14, 2019

D. Delaware reversed in CenTrak case

CenTrak, Inc. sued Sonitor Technologies, Inc. for alleged infringement
of U.S. Patent No. 8,604,909 (’909 patent), which claims systems for locating and identifying
portable devices using ultrasonic base stations. The district court
granted Sonitor’s motions for summary judgment that claims 1, 7, 8, 16, 18, 21, 22, and 26 are invalid
for lack of written description and that claims 1, 7, 8, 16,
18, 21, and 22 are not infringed. Because the district court
erred in determining that there were no genuine disputes
of material fact on both issues, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.

Ariad is cited as to written description:

We have held that “the test for sufficiency” of a patent’s
written description “is whether the disclosure of the application
relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in
the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter
as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
“[T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners
of the specification from the perspective of a person of
ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe
an invention understandable to that
skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”
Id. A “mere wish or plan”
for obtaining the claimed invention does not satisfy the
written description requirement. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

The issue of whether a claimed invention satisfies the written description requirement
is a question of fact. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.


As CenTrak correctly points out, a patented invention
must satisfy separate written description and enablement
requirements. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. The governing
statute states, in relevant part: “The specification shall
contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same . . . .” 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006).3 One purpose of this statutory
provision is to require an inventor to provide sufficient detail
in a patent’s specification to enable a person of ordinary
skill in the art to make and use the invention. But a separate purpose
of this text “is to ‘ensure that the scope of the
right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the
scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of ..


Thus, we have explained, “written
description is about whether the skilled reader of the patent disclosure can recognize that what was claimed corresponds to what was described; it is not about whether the
patentee has proven to the skilled reader that the invention works, or how to make it work, which is an enablement
issue.” Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d
1180, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
In this case, genuine issues of material fact remain as
to whether disclosure of the implementation details that
the district court identified is necessary to satisfy the written description requirement. The considerations relied on
by the district court and Sonitor do not compel summary
judgment for lack of written description. As an initial matter, the district court leaned heavily on the fact that the
specification devoted relatively less attention to the ultrasonic embodiment compared to the infrared embodiment.
But in ScriptPro LLC v. Innovation Associates, Inc., 833
F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), we explained that “a specification’s focus on one particular embodiment or purpose
cannot limit the described invention where that specification expressly contemplates other embodiments or purposes.”


Based on the evidence of record, there is a material dispute of fact as
to whether the named inventors actually
possessed an ultrasonic RTL system at the time they filed
their patent application or whether they were “leaving it to
the . . . industry to complete an unfinished invention.” Novozymes A/S v.
DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723
F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d
at 1353). Thus, the district court erred in granting summary judgment.

Wednesday, February 13, 2019

CAFC in IBG LLC: We conclude that the Board’s reasoning with regard to the ’132 and ’304 patents is internally inconsistent and therefore arbitrary and capricious.

The decision of the Board is vacated:

TT appeals, among other issues, the Board’s determinations regarding
whether the patents are directed to a
technological invention. Petitioners appeal the Board’s determinations
that the claims of the ’304 and ’132 patents
are patent eligible and that claims 29, 39, and 49 of the ’132
patent would not have been obvious. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). We vacate the decision of
the Board in each case because the patents at issue are for
technological inventions and thus were not properly subject to CBM review.

Saturday, February 09, 2019

"Consumer Watchdog" case cited in Momenta case on standing

Momenta argues that since the purpose of the America
Invents Act is to provide an alternative to district court litigation,
appeal should be available from the PTAB as it
would be available from a district court decision. Momenta
states that the estoppel provision provides injury-in-fact,
and that this suffices to support constitutional standing.
However, estoppel of Momenta is irrelevant now that Momenta has
“exited” its development of the Orencia® product. Estoppel cannot constitute an injury-in-fact when
Momenta “is not engaged in any activity that would give
rise to a possible infringement suit.” Consumer Watchdog,
753 F.3d at 1262; see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S.
693, 704 (2013) (the party must be in the position of
“seek[ing] a remedy for a personal and tangible harm”);
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (“the requirement
of such a personal stake [in the outcome] ‘ensures
that courts exercise power that is judicial in nature’”
(quoting Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441 (2007))).

Continental Circuits prevails in appeal against Intel at CAFC

The outcome indicated an error in claim construction by the district court of Arizona:

Continental Circuits LLC appeals from the judgment
of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
of noninfringement of the asserted claims of U.S. Patents 7,501,582
(“the ’582 patent”); 8,278,560 (“the ’560
patent”); 8,581,105 (“the ’105 patent”); and 9,374,912 (“the
’912 patent”). See Final Judgment, Cont’l Circuits LLC v.
Intel Corp., No. 16-2026 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2017), ECF No.
273. The parties stipulated to a judgment of noninfringement,
see Stipulation & Joint Motion, Cont’l Circuits LLC
v. Intel Corp., No. 16-2026 (D. Ariz. Sept. 7, 2017), ECF No.
266, based on the district court’s claim construction of certain claim terms,
see Cont’l Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp., No.
16-2026, 2017 WL 3478659 (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2017) (“Claim
Construction Order”). Because we conclude that the district court erred
in its claim construction, we vacate the
judgment of noninfringement and remand for further proceedings.

An issue was reading a limitation into the claims:

The district court construed the Category 1 Terms to
require that the “surface,” “removal,” or “etching” of the
dielectric material be “produced by a repeated desmear process.”
See Claim Construction Order, 2017 WL 3478659, at
*2–3 (emphasis added). The district court concluded that
Intel had “met the exacting standard required” to read a
limitation into the claims. Id. at *3. Specifically, the district court
found that the specification not only “repeatedly
distinguishe[d] the process covered by the patent from the
prior art and its use of a ‘single desmear process,’” id. at *4,
but also characterized “the present invention” as using a
repeated desmear process, see id. at *5.

The CAFC take on Teva is recited:

Claim construction is ultimately a question of law that
we review de novo. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). Any subsidiary factual findings
based on extrinsic evidence “must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.”
Id. But “when the district court reviews
only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and
specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution history),
the judge’s determination will amount solely to a determination of law,”
which we review de novo. Id.

Continental prevailed:

We agree with Continental that the district court erred
in limiting the claims to require a repeated desmear process.
In construing claims, district courts give claims their
ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning
that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips
v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc). “[B]ecause patentees frequently use terms idiosyncratically,
the court looks to” sources including “the words
of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification,
the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant
scientific principles, the meaning of
technical terms, and the state of the art.” Id. at 1314
(quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration
Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004))

The meaning of "invention"

35 U.S. Code § 100 (a) defines invention:

The term “invention” means invention or discovery.

However, note states:

Each and everything that surrounds us and we are using in our day to day
life is either discovered or invented, by experts. Most people have
a misconception regarding the words discovery and invention
, due to
which they end up with the supposition that these two are one and the same thing.
But that is not true, as discovery means uncovering something, which already existed,
but not recognised by anybody else before, i.e. finding something unexpected.

On the other hand, the invention refers to creating something new and useful,
with one’s ideas and experiments. In short, it means creating or designing something.
So, check out this article to know the difference between discovery and invention in detail.


Withing episode 11 of the first year of the tv series "Numbers," one finds Larry
speaking to Charlie:

Science you know, science, not this, but real science, is discovery, Charles.
It's not invention.
The truths are there, whether we find them or not.


Saturday, February 02, 2019

What is a country?

On 1 February 2019, "Travel Trivia" identified Greenland as the least densely populated country.
As Bill Clinton might say, it depends on the meaning of the word "country."
[Recall the Clinton text: "It depends upon what the meaning of the word 'is' is.]

Wikipedia notes:

On 21 June 2009, Greenland gained self-rule with provisions for assuming responsibility
for self-government of judicial affairs, policing, and natural resources.
Also, Greenlanders were recognized as a separate people under international law.
(One country, two systems)[62] Denmark maintains control of foreign affairs and defence matters.
Denmark upholds the annual block grant of 3.2 billion Danish kroner, but as Greenland begins
to collect revenues of its natural resources, the grant will gradually be diminished.
This is generally considered to be a step toward eventual full independence from Denmark.[63]
Greenlandic was declared the sole official language of Greenland at the historic ceremony.


The Prime Minister of the “Naalakkersuisut”, Greenland’s Home Rule, Kuupik Kleist,
has declared that his Government will seek independence from Denmark when the economic situation allows.
In a self-governing agreement with Denmark in 2009, the Greenlanders were recognized as a distinct people
with the right to self-determination and given greater control over potential oil finds.

In practice the agreement can serve as a road map to independence if /when the 57,000 Greenlanders
are self-sufficient but for now they are dependent on grants from the state budget of Denmark.
Greenland has been part of the Danish Kingdom for three hundred years but was granted limited
sovereignty when home rule was established in 1979.


From Travel Trivia