Regeneron loses at CAFC on inequitable conduct

The CAFC affirmed inequitable conduct in Regeneron v. Merus,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13578:


Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Regeneron”) appeals from a final judgment of the district court holding U.S. Patent No. 8,502,018 (“’018 patent”) unenforceable because of Regeneron’s inequitable conduct during prosecution. Regeneron also appeals the district court’s construction of several claim terms and determination of indefiniteness. Because we conclude that Regeneron engaged in inequitable conduct during prosecution of the ’018 patent, we affirm.



The subject was antibodies:



Antibodies are proteins that the body uses to counteract specific pathogens such as bacteria, viruses, and other foreign substances in the blood. Antibodies are typically represented by a “Y” shape consisting of four chains of amino acids: two longer “heavy” chains, and two shorter “light” chains. Each of the chains, in turn, consists of two regions: a “variable” region toward the top of the “Y,” and a “constant” region toward the bottom.

(...)

Mouse DNA coding for antibodies can be modified using human DNA in various different ways. For example, mouse DNA can be manipulated to create chimeric antibodies that have mouse variable region DNA and human constant region DNA. Similarly, mice can be used to create humanized antibodies that have some mouse variable region DNA, some human variable region DNA, and human constant region DNA.


Of some of the "bad" acts:


Drs. Jones and Smeland together planned an in-person meeting with the Examiner during which they relied on the misleading presentation asserting that Regeneron had developed a commercial embodiment of the claimed mouse. That meeting occurred in March 2013. Following that meeting, in April 2013, the PTO issued a Notice of Allowance for the ’176 application.

(...)

Dr. Smeland knew of the third party submission as well as all four Withheld References during prosecution, yet withheld them from the ’018 patent’s examiner. Although Regeneron did not disclose the Withheld References during prosecution of the ’018 patent, once the ’018 patent had been allowed, Regeneron disclosed the Withheld References to the PTO in every related application having the same specification and similar claims. Merus contends that Regeneron’s failure to disclose the Withheld References constituted inequitable conduct. Regeneron responds that Dr. Smeland was under no obligation to disclose these references because they were not but-for material.

(...)

Direct evidence of intent is not, however, required. A court may infer intent from circumstantial evidence. Id. An inference of intent to deceive is appropriate where the applicant engages in “a pattern of lack of candor,” including where the applicant repeatedly makes factual representations “contrary to the true information he had in his possession.” Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., 763 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

(...)

On appeal, Merus asserts that Drs. Smeland and Murphy violated their duty of candor and engaged in inequitable conduct. Regeneron does not contest that both of these individuals had a duty of candor to the PTO. Regeneron, however, argues that the duty was not violated because none of the Withheld References were but-for material and because the district court improperly concluded that the applicants possessed the necessary specific intent to deceive the PTO.




Claim scope was an important issue:


But Regeneron argues that under the broadest reasonable construction of claim 1, the non-variable (constant) region of the claimed mouse’s modified gene segments exclusively contains mouse genes. In other words, Regeneron argues that claim 1 is limited to a reverse chimeric mouse. Appellant’s Br. 32–35. Merus, on the other hand, argues that the constant region of the gene segments in the claimed mouse may contain mouse genes or human genes, and may, therefore, be reverse chimeric, humanized, or fully human. Appellee’s Br. 51.

(...)

But Regeneron points to no portion of the specification to support its argument. In context, it is clear that the endogenously produced antibodies may comprise a human constant region. The specification thus does not limit the claims to mice with human variable regions and mouse constant regions. Accordingly, we disagree with Regeneron and conclude that under the broadest reasonable construction, the district court correctly found that the claims are not limited to mice that solely comprise mouse constant region gene segments.



AND


Under this broadest reasonable construction, the court next determines if the district court clearly erred in finding the Withheld References but-for material and not cumulative of prior art that the PTO considered during prosecution. We conclude that the district court properly found that the Withheld References were but-for material and were not cumulative.



Of an issue by the dissent:



The dissent argues that Wood is not material because it only teaches a “DNA fragment construct” but does not describe “any targeted insertion method described elsewhere in the prior art . . . .” Dissent at 17. As an initial matter, neither party argues this position and the district court did not make this factual finding. See 3M Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 673 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is improper for us to determine factual issues in the first instance on appeal . . . finding those facts in the first instance would overstep our bounds as a reviewing court and we cannot resolve the parties’ factual disputes on appeal.”). Regardless, the dissent’s argument is unavailing because the claim at issue does not recite a particular method of inserting DNA into a mouse. The claim simply recites a genetically modified mouse that comprises “human unrearranged variable region gene segments inserted at an endogenous mouse immunoglobulin locus.” Wood teaches that “[t]he animals of this invention are designed by the integration into their germlines of DNA carrying unrearranged or only partially rearranged exogenous Ig gene segments.” J.A. 2127. Wood thus teaches the elements of the claim at issue and is butfor material.



Of importance on intent:


As noted earlier, the district court never held a second trial to determine if Regeneron acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO during prosecution. Instead, the court sanctioned Regeneron for its litigation misconduct by drawing an adverse inference of specific intent. Contrary to Regeneron’s arguments, we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Regeneron in this manner.

Regeneron’s behavior in district court was beset with troubling misconduct. In its November 2015 opinion, the district court extensively detailed Regeneron’s litigation misconduct and exercised its discretion to sanction Regeneron. See Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 585–96. On appeal, Regeneron argues that the district court abused its discretion by sanctioning Regeneron, but does not meaningfully dispute any of the factual findings underlying the district court’s decision. Accordingly, we largely repeat, and adopt, the district court’s factual findings regarding Regeneron’s litigation misconduct below.


Of gaming:


During claim construction, Regeneron again chose tactics over substance. Because Regeneron was the plaintiff, the district court’s rules required that Regeneron first propose its claim constructions, and that the defendant then respond. Regeneron took the position that no terms required construction. The district court issued an order expressing its concern that Regeneron was attempting to “game” the system by shifting the burden to Merus to propose constructions and then to take shots at those proposals. Discovery Order #5, Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus B.V., No. 14-cv-1650, 2014 WL 3865366, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014), Dkt. No. 81. To avoid this potential gamesmanship, the district court required Regeneron to live by its plain language constructions. Id. at *2


The dissent by Judge Newman began:


The only issue decided by the panel majority is the district court's ruling of inequitable conduct during patent prosecution.1 I respectfully dissent, for my colleagues apply incorrect law and add confusion to precedent.



Her main arguments:


"Inequitable conduct" arises when material references were intentionally withheld by the patent applicant in order to deceive or mislead the examiner into granting the patent. Both materiality and intent must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Intent to deceive cannot be inferred; yet here, the district court inferred intent to deceive during prosecution and invalidated the patent, as a sanction for purported attorney misconduct during this litigation.

The district court found that certain uncited references were "but-for material" to patentability—although the court did not find the '018 patent claims invalid on the substantive content of these references. The district court then declined to decide the question of specific intent to deceive the patent examiner. Instead, the court cancelled the scheduled trial on the question of intent, adopted an "inference" of intent, and held the '018 patent unenforceable on grounds of inequitable conduct as a sanction for Regeneron's "litigation misconduct" relating to discovery and the privilege log during this litigation.

The panel majority acknowledges that "the district court never held a second trial to determine if Regeneron acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO during prosecution." Maj. Op. at 21. This absence of trial and trial findings on this critical issue cannot be substituted by inference.
Nor is the appellate role to scour the Appendix to fill the gap and make our own appellate finding of "intent to deceive." Here, no evidentiary record was developed on intent to deceive, with no testimony and no opportunity for examination and cross-examination of witnesses. The panel majority instead engages in innuendo based on its careful selections from documents not admitted into evidence. The panel majority thus convicts Regeneron, its counsel, and its scientists, with no trial, no evidence, and no opportunity to respond in their defense.

Materiality does not establish intent; deliberate withholding of but-for invalidating prior art, with the intent to deceive the examiner, must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The majority's mechanism whereby dispositive facts are found for the first time on appeal, with no right of traverse by the affected party, is contrary to fundamental fairness and judicial process. If the panel majority indeed believes that the four "uncited" references are but-for material to patentability, we should at least require trial of the question of intent.



Judge Newman cites cases from 1933 and 1944:


Precedent is long-standing, unambiguous, and binding. In Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 54 S. Ct. 146, 78 L. Ed. 293, 1934 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 639 (1933), the Court established that litigation misconduct can support the dismissal of the suit, whereas patent invalidity or unenforceability must be established on the law of validity or enforceability. Applying Keystone Driller, in Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001), this court held that:
[T]he remedies for litigation misconduct bar the malfeasant who committed the misconduct. The property right itself remains independent of the conduct of a litigant.
Id. at 1375. This court elaborated:
Leaving the patent right intact, the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that litigation misconduct bars the litigant. Again in Hazel—Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford—Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250, 1944 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 675 (1944), overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18, 97 S. Ct. 31, 50 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1976), another instance of extreme litigation misconduct, the Supreme Court "require[d] that Hartford be denied relief," but left the patent right intact. Id. at 251.
Id. We continued to explain that in order to invalidate the patent, the inequitable conduct must have occurred in patent prosecution:
Litigation misconduct, while serving as a basis to dismiss the wrongful litigant, does not infect, or even affect, the original grant of the property right.

Id. We concluded:
No case law from the Supreme Court or this court provides a basis for nullifying property rights granted by the United States when such property rights did not themselves accrue through inequitable conduct.
Id. at 1377.
The Aptix holding has been applied in trial forums across the nation. E.g., Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21474, 2011 WL 679337, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 16, 2011) ("[A]lleged litigation misconduct is not sufficient to support a counterclaim of unenforcea-blity of a patent."); MedPointe Healthcare Inc. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d 457, 467 (D.N.J. 2005) ("[B]ecause the alleged misconduct involved conduct before the court and not before the patent office during the procurement of the patent, it does not taint the property right ab initio to render the patent unenforceable."); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (D. Del. 2005) ("If the wrongdoing occurs during the prosecution of the patent, in the furtherance of obtaining a patent right, then it can render the patent unenforceable. Alternatively, if unclean hands occurs during litigation, it bars any recovery by the offending party.").



Related to claim construction, the dissent notes:


The parties debate several aspects of the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim terms, but neither the district court's nor my colleagues' analysis shows that any "withheld reference" is more material than the cited references. Under the district court's "broadest reasonable interpretation," the '018 claims require a genetically modified mouse, the genes of which have been modified using the particular large targeting vector method described in the specification, by the insertion of human variable region DNA in its germline configuration into or next to the endogenous mouse immunoglobulin locus. Dist. Ct. Op. at 564-67. The "withheld references" indeed relate to genetic modification, but they are not but-for material as compared with the references before the examiner.
The district court does not establish that the allegedly withheld references lead to unpatentability. Instead, the district court states that the references disclose motivations, benefits, and cumulative teachings. [*63] That is correct; but the references do not provide but-for materiality, whether taken alone, or with the cited references.


After the post on IPBiz, there was a lengthy post on PatentDocs, which began


In a decision that took an inordinately long time to arrive (oral argument was held in mid-January), the Federal Circuit in Regeneron Pharmaceuticals v. Merus today affirmed the District Court's decision that the claims of Regeneron's patent-in-suit was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct in its procurement. However, the manner in which the District Court made its determination, and the Federal Circuit's affirmance in a divided opinion (by Chief Judge Prost joined by Judge Wallach, with a dissent by Judge Newman), raise questions regarding the proper implementation of the Court's en banc decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) that remain unresolved.



link: http://www.patentdocs.org/2017/07/regeneron-pharmaceuticals-inc-v-merus-nv-fed-cir-2017.html