Patent Docs on Cleveland Clinic. Matter of cherry-picking.

Kevin Noonan's post on Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC begins:



Most people have had the experience of becoming lost and, having arrived at their destination, realizing that it was only one false turn that caused their confusion. For those with a physics background one can recall the feature of vector calculus that a small displacement at a first position can result in a large displacement at a later position further along the vector's path. Both these thoughts come unbidden when reading the Federal Circuit's decision on June 16th in Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (where the one false turn was the Court's decision in Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom and that initial "small nudge" can be found in the Supreme Court's Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories decision).


Within his text, the topic of cherry-picking arose:


Addressing the procedural issues, the panel held that considering (and granting) a motion to dismiss based on Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) without claim construction was not error, nor was there error in considering certain claims to be representative. Curiously, the Court based its affirmance of the latter principle on substantive grounds, that it disagreed with Cleveland Clinic that other claims provided the requisite "inventive concept" that the representative claims did not. This basis does not address the underlying question, of whether generally a district court can cherry pick claims asserted by a plaintiff to find that the Mayo/Alice test is not satisfied, and while this conclusion may be the correct one, in this case affirming this procedural shortcut precludes future plaintiffs of the ability to overcome a Section 101 challenge based on there being at least one asserted claim that satisfies the test. Of course, the precedent regarding Cleveland Clinics' second challenge, that a district court can grant a motion to dismiss without claim construction, is as prevalent as it is mystifying, and the panel here relies upon some of it to affirm the procedural posture of the case (e.g., Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2016).



link to patent docs post:
http://www.patentdocs.org/2017/06/cleveland-clinic-foundation-v-true-health-diagnostics-llc-fed-cir-2017.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PatentDocs+%28Patent+Docs%29

Cherry-picking mentioned in other cases:

From 833 F.3d 656 (CA6 2016)

For instance, various appellate briefs supporting the Secretary's position now characterize Metzger's report, which was included with the plaintiffs' complaint, as "junk science" and attack its alleged "cherry picking" of data. But the Secretary never submitted any contrary proof to the district court. She did not even request limited discovery until July 13, 2016, the day before the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and over seven weeks after the motion was filed. By that point, the district court reasonably concluded that her request was not timely.



From 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5578



Zheng asserts that the BIA "ignored relevant sections of the country reports" and "abused its discretion by cherry-picking the record evidence." "We presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise." Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006).


From 786 F.3d 733 :


As Garcia characterizes it, "the main issue in this case involves the vicious frenzy against Ms. Garcia that the Film caused among certain radical elements of the Muslim community." We are sympathetic to her plight. Nonetheless, the claim against Google is grounded in copyright law, not privacy, emotional distress, or tort law, and Garcia seeks to impose speech restrictions under copyright laws meant to foster rather than repress free expression. Garcia's theory can be likened to "copyright cherry picking," which would enable any contributor from a costume designer down to an extra or best boy to claim copyright in random bits and pieces of a unitary motion picture without [**9] satisfying the requirements of the Copyright Act. Putting aside the rhetoric of Hollywood hijinks and the dissent's [***1609] dramatics, this case must be decided on the law.