CAFC discusses websites in personal jurisdiction case Nexlearn v. Allen

The CAFC affirmed D. Kansas on lack of personal jurisdication.

Of the law:


“Personal jurisdiction is a question of law that we review
de novo.” Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech.
Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We apply
Federal Circuit law when reviewing claims “intimately
involved with the substance of the patent laws” and the
law of the regional circuit when reviewing state law
claims. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Where, as here, the district court
decided personal jurisdiction “based on affidavits and
other written materials in the absence of an evidentiary
hearing, a plaintiff need only to make a prima facie showing
that defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction.”
Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We “accept the uncontroverted
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and resolve
any factual conflicts in the affidavits in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Id. To make a prima facie showing, we ask
“whether a forum state’s long-arm statute permits service
of process and whether assertion of personal jurisdiction
violates due process.” Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1017.
The Kansas Supreme Court has interpreted Kansas’ longarm
statute to extend jurisdiction to the fullest extent
allowed by due process. Merriman v. Crompton Corp.,
146 P.3d 162, 179 (Kan. 2006).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “it is well established—in
certain classes of cases—that, once a court has
original jurisdiction over some claims in the action, it may
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims
that are part of the same case or controversy.” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552
(2005). To exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the district
court “must first have original jurisdiction over at least
one claim in the action.” Id. at 554.




At district court:


Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
NexLearn, the district court held that NexLearn failed to
allege that Allen had sufficient contacts with Kansas to
permit the exercise of specific jurisdiction. It determined
the NDA and EULA Kansas choice-of-law and forumselection
provisions were not relevant for specific jurisdiction
over NexLearn’s patent infringement claim. It held
that because five of Allen’s six emails to NexLearn employees
were sent before the ’522 patent issued on August
5, 2014, NexLearn’s patent infringement claim could
not have arisen out of or related to these emails. It held
Allen’s sole post-issuance email, as well as its offer of a
free trial of ZebraZapps to a NexLearn employee, could
not form a basis for exercising jurisdiction because these
contacts were manufactured by NexLearn’s unilateral
acts. The NexLearn employees, it reasoned, received
Allen’s emails only because they subscribed to Allen’s
mass emailing list and received a free trial of ZebraZapps
only because of a purchase attempt. Regarding Allen’s
ZebraZapps website, the district court held the website
alone, absent evidence of an actual sale, was insufficient
to confer specific jurisdiction. It held neither Allen’s
single sale of an unaccused product to a Kansas resident
nor its general advertisement in a trade publication was
relevant to NexLearn’s patent infringement claim. Because
it held it lacked personal jurisdiction over
NexLearn’s patent infringement claim, and because
NexLearn did not assert breach of contract as an independent
basis for the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
the district court granted Allen’s motion to
dismiss.



Plaintiff-appellant Nexlearn argued:


NexLearn alleges that personal jurisdiction exists for
its patent infringement claim, the only claim over which it
asserts the district court possesses original jurisdiction. A
district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant pursuant to either general or
specific jurisdiction. Under general jurisdiction, a district
court can “hear any and all claims against [out-of-state
defendants] when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially
at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134
S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014) (citation omitted). Specific jurisdiction
instead “focuses on the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore,
134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (alteration omitted). To
comport with due process, the out-of-state defendant must
have “minimum contacts” with the forum State “such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). At oral argument,
NexLearn stated it alleged both general and specific
jurisdiction. Oral arg. at 15:03–16:10. NexLearn did
not argue general jurisdiction in its briefing to us or below
to the district court. See NexLearn Br. 10; J.A. 7
(“NexLearn does not allege general jurisdiction but rather
that Allen had minimum contacts with Kansas based on
specific jurisdiction.”). We thus decline to address general
jurisdiction.




The CAFC stated:


We agree with the district court’s determination that
Allen’s contacts predating the issuance of the ’522 patent
are not relevant contacts for establishing specific jurisdiction
over NexLearn’s patent infringement claim.






As to a website:


Allen’s website together with its contacts with
NexLearn create only an “attenuated affiliation” with
Kansas as opposed to a “substantial connection” with the
forum State as required for specific jurisdiction. See
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. We thus affirm the district
court’s dismissal of NexLearn’s patent infringement claim
for lack of personal jurisdiction.




Of the supplemental (contract) claims:


While neither party
disputes that a claim for patent infringement falls within
the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a), the district court’s dismissal of
that claim for lack of personal jurisdiction left no remaining
claim over which the district court could exercise
original subject matter jurisdiction. See J.A. 17. A district
court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim where original subject matter jurisdiction does not
exist. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of NexLearn’s patent infringement claim
for lack of personal jurisdiction, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of NexLearn’s supplemental claim for
breach of contract.