CAFC considers "final decisons" in Halo v. Pulse case

The case concerned U.S. Patents 5,656,985, 6,297,720, and
6,344,785 of patentee Halo, which were found infringed by Pulse.


The outcome of Halo v. Pulse :


Pulse Electronics, Inc. and Pulse Electronics Corporation
(together, “Pulse”) appeal from the decision of the
United States District Court for the District of Nevada
awarding Halo Electronics, Inc. (“Halo”) prejudgment
interest. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No.
2:07-cv-00331-APG-PAL, slip op. (D. Nev. Apr. 6, 2016)
(Joint Appendix “J.A.” 1–2). Because we lack jurisdiction,
we dismiss.



Here,


We must first address whether we have jurisdiction.1
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), which embodies the
final judgment rule, our jurisdiction is limited to an
appeal from a “final decision” of a district court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1). The Supreme Court has stated that a final
decision “generally is one which ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute
the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233
(1945); see also Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517,
521–22 (1988).



Of interest is footnote 2:


Although it is our practice to follow precedent of
the regional circuits on issues not unique to our areas of
exclusive jurisdiction, we have adopted our own precedent
on matters relating to our own appellate jurisdiction. See
Woodard v. Sage Prods., Inc., 818 F.2d 841, 844 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (en banc).



No final decision here:


As a result, there is no final decision because the district
court has not “determine[d], or specif[ied] the means for
determining the amount” of prejudgment interest. F. &
M. Schaefer Brewing, 356 U.S. at 233–34 (holding that a
district court opinion setting the amount of the refund
was not a final judgment where “the action also sought
recovery of interest . . . from the date of payment to the
date of judgment” and the district court’s “opinion does
not state the date or dates of payment and, hence, did not
state facts necessary to compute the amount of interest to
be included in the judgment”).4 We therefore lack jurisdiction
under § 1295(a)(1).
For similar reasons, we also lack jurisdiction pursuant
to § 1292(c)(2). “As an exception to the final judgment
rule, § 1292(c)(2) is to be interpreted narrowly.” Arlington
Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 759 F.3d 1333,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Regardless whether prejudgment
interest is part of an accounting or not, the award of
prejudgment interest itself in this case is not final. We
have held that § 1292(c)(2) “does not go so far as to permit
us to consider [a] non-final order” that is related to the
accounting. Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v.
Cochlear Corp., 841 F.3d 1334, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016)



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