Canard in LIEBERMANN

From within Ex parte Liebermann, 10/718,023

We find Lynt explicitly discloses the disputed limitations of claims 1,
22 and 27, and thus we affirm the rejections of these claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) and § 103(a). Anticipation is the epitome of obviousness. Jones v.
Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also In re Fracalossi, 681
F.2d 792, 794 (CCPA 1982); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402 (CCPA
1974).

Elsewhere:

We find the Specification does not define the term “input describing a
dynamic element” (FF 4) but describes it as providing action to body parts,
such as vibration or movement (FF 5). This is not an ipsissimis verbis test,
i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832
(Fed. Cir. 1990). We find Lynt discloses transmitting at least one physical
input describing a dynamic element using both movement (FF 6) and
vibration (FF 7), thus meeting the claim language.

Of non-functional content:

Although the signal may have significance to the receiver, as a
code, the signal within the claim is merely non-functional content. Our
courts direct us not to give content such as this patentable weight. See In re
Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004).